



ON THE INCOHERENCE OF AGNOSTICISM 
[Preliminary Draft: Comments Welcome. Please do not cite without permission.] 
1. Introduction.  
 Almost everyone hedges bets on God's existence. It is difficult to find a 
theist that is absolutely certain that God exists or an atheist that is absolutely 
certain that God does not exist. Most believers and non-believers place some 
positive probability on the existence of God and some positive probability on the 
non-existence of God. If square theism is the view that it is absolutely certain that 
God exists, then most theists are not square theists. And if square atheism is the 
view that it is absolutely certain that God does not exist, then most atheists are not 
square atheists.  
 This is not at all surprising, given our evidential situation relative to the 
existence of God. Square theism has the unwarranted implication that no new 
evidence could diminish your belief in the existence of God. But it certainly seems 
like there at least might be such evidence. The epistemic situation is the same for 
square atheism. It too has the unwarranted implication that, no matter what new 
information becomes available, atheism is certain.  These extreme positions are 
not epistemically defensible. 
 In section (2) I argue that basic principles of epistemic probability entail 
that, for any modal proposition ☐p or ♢p, if the epistemic probability of ☐p or 




If it is not epistemically certain that ~♢p then it is epistemically certain that ♢p. 
Further, for any proposition q that entails a modal proposition ☐p or ♢p, if the 
epistemic probability of q is positive, then the epistemic probability of ☐p or ♢p 
is 1. Finally, for any modal proposition ☐p, if ☐p has a positive epistemic 
probability, then the epistemic probability of p is 1.   
 In section (3) I provide an argument that epistemic agents cannot hedge 
their bets on the existence of God. An agent that assigns a positive epistemic 
probability to the existence of God on their evidence E must assign epistemic 
probability 1 to the existence of God. The argument assumes that epistemic agents 
know the axioms of probability and know the axioms of S5. It is also assumed that 
they know the basic principles of epistemic probability T4, T4.1, T5, and T6. The 
unsettling conclusion is that theism requires full commitment to the existence of 
God and atheism requires full commitment to the non-existence of God. There is 
no coherent epistemic attitude to the existence of God between these extreme 
attitudes. 
2. Epistemic Probability  
 The thesis in T1 expresses what seems to be a trivial relation between 
modal propositions and objective probabilities. 
T1. If a proposition p is metaphysically or logically impossible then the probability 




The impossibility in T1 is metaphysical impossibility. A proposition is impossible 
if and only if the proposition is false in every possible world. There are no possible 
circumstances or conditions under which it is true. Propositions that are 
impossible standardly (sometimes exclusively) have 0 probability. 
 The probability in T1 is objective probability or chance. Objective 
probabilities are typically characterized as real features of the world. We find them, 
for instance, in how often people contract diseases, how probable it is that a coin 
will fall heads and how probable it is that an atom of radium will decay in the next 
1600 years. Whether or not we come to know or believe the objective probability 
of contracting a disease, the chances of contracting that disease remains the same.1 
The objective probability of p is 0 if p is metaphysically or logically impossible.  
 It is similarly trivial that metaphysically or logically necessary propositions 
are certain to be true. If every impossible proposition p has probability 0 then 
every necessary proposition ~p has probability 1.  
T2. If a proposition p is metaphysically or logically necessary then the probability 
that p is true is 1. 
A proposition is metaphysically necessary if and only if it is true in every possible 
world. There are no possible circumstances or conditions under which it is false. 




 The contrapositive of T1 states that any proposition that has a positive 
probability is not impossible. T3 also concerns the relations between metaphysical 
possibility and objective probabilities. 
T3. If the probability of p is positive, then p is (at least) possible.  
The thesis in T3 tells us that any proposition p that has some positive chance of 
being true is true in some possible world. If there is no world in all of 
metaphysical space in which p is true, then it has no chance of being true. 
 T1 – T3 do not directly govern epistemic probability or the probability 
agents assign to a proposition on the basis of her evidence E. The epistemic 
probability of p on E is one's estimate of how probable p is given the data in E 
and it can be true that your estimate of the probability of p on E violates T1 – T3. 
Suppose that E is your evidence for a false mathematical proposition p, for 
instance. E might include your (mistaken) proof that p. You might assign a 
positive epistemic probability to p, given your evidence E, despite the fact that p is 
impossible. Suppose E is the evidence against a true mathematical proposition p. 
E might include your (mistaken) disproof that p. You might assign no positive 
probability to p given E, despite the fact that p is necessarily true. 
 The epistemic probability that a proposition p is true is not in general p's 
objective probability. Once a coin has landed heads, the objective probability that 
a coin has landed heads is extremely high—some say 1—but your epistemic 




the coin landed.  It might be true that the objective probability or chance that the 
universe had a beginning is 0, if it never had a beginning. Still, on the evidence we 
possess, there is a reasonable probability that the universe had a beginning. The 
probabilities of the rival hypotheses of 'big bang and 'steady state', for instance, are 
epistemic probabilities. These epistemic probabilities are a measure of the 
confirmation current evidence provides for these alternative hypotheses.  
 An agent's epistemic probability for p is also not an agent's credence or 
degree of belief for p.2 An agent's credence that p is not in general the probability 
of p relative to the agent's evidence. It is not a measure of the confirmation 
current evidence provides for p. You might, for instance, believe it will probably 
rain tonight, and that credence might not be based on having checked the weather 
forecast or even having been outside. Your credence that it will rain tonight 
needn't be based on any evidence at all—it might just be a hunch—and so is not 
the epistemic probability that it will rain. 
 The epistemic probability that p is true is the probability of p given an 
agent's evidence E. It is a measure of confirmation and not a measure of degree of 
belief or confidence. Nonetheless it's frequently true that an epistemic agent must 
estimate the degree of confirmation E provides for p. And epistemic agents can 
disagree on that issue. What degree of confirmation does our evidence provide for 
an oscillating universe? Epistemic agents offer various estimates, each of which 




of confirmation does the discovery of iconography provide for a particular 
religious practice? Epistemic agents will again vary in reasonable estimates. The 
epistemic probability that p is the probability that p given evidence E. But nothing 
about epistemic probability requires that the degree of confirmation should be 
obvious or that the degree confirmation should not be a matter of dispute.  
 It's worth noting that the theses in T1 – T3 are indirectly relevant to 
epistemic probability.  It is true for instance, that if you know that proposition p is 
impossible, then your epistemic probability for p should be 0. That impossible 
propositions have probability 0 is a consequence of the probability axioms.3 The 
probability axioms restrict the assignment of epistemic probability to the extent 
that we know, for instance, that p entails q, or that p and q are mutually exclusive, 
or that p is necessary or impossible.  If you know that p is necessary, then your 
epistemic probability for p should be 1, since again, that is a requirement of the 
probability axioms. There are additional principles that directly govern epistemic 
probability.  
T4.  P(☐p | E) is positive only if P( p | E) = 1 
 What does T4 state? According to T4, if you assign some positive 
probability to the modal proposition ☐p on the evidence you have E, then you 
must assign the proposition p probability 1 on your evidence.4 But what makes T4 
true? If P(☐p | E) is positive—as stated in the antecedent of T4—then, of course, 




M.  (p ⟶ q) ⟶ (P(p | E) < P(q | E))5 
According to M, if p entails q, then the probability of q on E is at least as high as 
the probability of p on E. Since it is true that  (◻p ⟶ p), and we know that 
 P(p | E) is positive.  Still, it is reasonable to ask why we can't assign P(p | E) 
some value greater than 0 but less than 1.  
  If we assign a positive probability to P(☐p | E)—as in the antecedent of 
T4—then we must believe that ~  (E ⟶ ~☐p). That is, we must believe that our 
evidence E does not entail ~☐p. If we believed that our evidence E entailed 
~☐p, (and that E was consistent) then we would believe that P(~☐p | E) = 1, 
and so that P(☐p| E) = 0.6  By a simple logical transformation, ~  (E ⟶ ~☐p) 
entails ♢(E & ☐p). But the formula ♢(E & ☐p) entails ♢☐p, and in S5 ♢☐p 
entails  ☐p. So we know via the probability axioms that P( ☐p| E) = 1. And it 
follows by M that P( p| E) = 1.7 That establishes T4. T4.1 follows from T4 and M 
directly, since  (☐p ⟶ ☐p). 
T4.1  P(☐p | E) is positive only if P(☐p | E) = 1 
 The argument briefly is that we believe that P(☐p | E) is positive only if 
we believe that ☐p is consistent with E, or that ♢(E & ☐p). If we did not believe 




= 0 or that P(☐p | E)  is undefined.8 But by hypothesis we do believe that P(☐p 
| E) is positive. So, we should conclude that P(☐p | E) = 1.  
 It's important to note that the argument does not aim to show that 
epistemic agents who believe that P(☐p | E) is positive will in general conclude 
that P( p | E) = 1. It is not assumed that epistemic agents are perfectly rational.  
But it does require a mistake in reasoning to believe that P(☐p | E) is positive and 
not arrive at the conclusion that P( p | E) = 1. It also requires a mistake in 
reasoning to believe that P(☐p | E) is positive and not arrive at the conclusion 
that P(☐p | E) = 1. It is in fact a very common mistake to believe that we can 
assign a modal proposition some positive epistemic probability less than 1.  
 It's a direct consequence of the thesis in T4 and T4.1 that if I assign any 
modal proposition—any propositions such as ♢p or  q that includes a (wide 
scope) modal operator—a positive epistemic probability, then I must assign it 
probability 1. I can assign ♢p or  q an epistemic probability n (0 < n < 1) only if 
I make a mistake in reasoning. For instance, I might fail to see that ♢p or  q 
entail in S5 that  ♢p or   q, or fail to note that modal inferences are governed 
by S5, or fail to observe the probability axioms. S5 axioms entail that every modal 
proposition is necessarily true or necessarily false and the probability axioms 




modal proposition p, the epistemic probability of p on E is 1 or 0. This follows 
from T4 and T4.1. 
 There are of course modal propositions whose truth-value we do not 
know. Famous examples include Goldbach's Conjecture (GC) and the Continuum 
Hypothesis (CH). If either of these mathematical propositions has a positive 
epistemic probability, then it has epistemic probability 1. No doubt some are 
inclined to assign CH a positive epistemic probability less than 1 on the evidence 
E. But if P(CH | E) is assigned, say, .5, then we must believe that CH is consistent 
with E. That is, we must believe that ♢(CH & E). But if ♢(CH & E) then  CH. 
That is a consequence of S5 and the fact that (  CH v  ~CH). CH is either 
necessarily true or necessarily false. But then it follows on the probability axioms 
that P(CH| E) = 1. On the other hand, if we do not believe that ♢(CH & E), then 
we believe that ◻(E ⟶ ~CH) and we cannot assign CH a positive probability. If 
we believe that ◻(E ⟶ ~CH), then we easily derive that either P(CH | E) = 0 or 
P(CH| E) is undefined.  Neither of these is consistent with assigning CH some 
positive probability on our evidence E. 
 Of course, we could also refuse to commit on an epistemic probability for 
P(CH| E). This is the position that we cannot estimate the confirmation that our 
evidence E provides for CH. It is important that this is not an agnostic attitude 
toward CH. It is not the position that the evidence E provides some confirmation 




that we have no idea whether evidence E confirms, disconfirms, or is irrelevant to 
CH. 
 It's also important to note that assigning epistemic probability 1 to 
proposition p on E is consistent with p being metaphysically impossible and 
having objective probability 0. T4 tells us only that an epistemic agent is 
committed to assigning p probability 1 on E, if she assigns ☐p some positive 
probability on E. The fact is that an epistemic agent might be mistaken in her 
assignment of positive probability to ☐p on E. Epistemic agents can and do 
wrongly estimate the epistemic probability of propositions on their evidence. 
Epistemic agents might also fail to notice that ☐p is true only if ☐☐p is true or 
that P(☐p| E) is positive only if ☐☐p. Given a sufficient number of errors an 
epistemic agent might find himself with an agnostic attitude toward CH. 
  The thesis in T5 also governs epistemic probability and follows directly 
from T4. From T4 and the fact that P(☐~p | E) is positive it follows that P( ~p | 
E) = 1, and so that P( p | E) = 0.  
T5. P(☐~p | E) is positive only if P( p | E) = 0 
 Again, T5 makes no claim about the actual metaphysical necessity of ~p. 
T5 states that if your estimate of the epistemic probability of ☐~p on evidence E 
is positive—if you believe, on the evidence, that there's some positive probability 




0. The argument is perfectly analogous to the argument for T4. If you believe that 
the probability of ☐~p on E is positive, then you must also believe that your 
evidence E is consistent with the modal proposition ☐~p or that ♢(E & ☐~p). 
Alternatively, if you believe that ☐(E ⟶ ~☐~p), then you would have to assign 
P(☐~p | E) either 0 or undefined.   
 Since in S5 ♢(E & ☐~p) entails ☐☐~p, the value of P(☐~p | E) = 1—all 
necessary truths take probability 1.  And it then follows from M that P( ~p | E) = 
1, and so that P( p | E) = 0. So, we should conclude that P(☐~p | E) is positive 
only if P( p | E) = 0. Of course, as we noted above, all of this is consistent with p 
in fact being necessarily true and the objective probability of p being 1. 
 The thesis in T6 states that if the epistemic probability of p on evidence E 
is positive, then the epistemic probability of ♢p on the same evidence E is 1. 
T6. P( p | E) is positive only if P( ♢p | E) = 1 
Why is my epistemic probability for ♢p be 1 if my epistemic probability for p 
given E is positive? If you believe that the probability of p on E is positive, then 
you must believe that ~☐(E ⟶ ~p). That is, you must believe that your evidence 
E does not entail ~p. If you believed that ☐(E ⟶ ~p), the only epistemic value 




 If, on the other hand, ~☐(E ⟶ ~p), then we can quickly derive ♢(E & p). 
And it is true in S5 that ♢(E & p) entails ☐♢p. But if ☐♢p—that is, if ♢p is 
necessarily true—then P(♢p| E) = 1. So, P( p | E) is positive only if P( ♢p | E) = 
1. If you assign p a positive epistemic probability on evidence E, then you should 
assign ♢p epistemic probability 1 on E. 
 It is worth underscoring that the argument does not aim to show that every 
epistemic agent will assign a positive epistemic probability to P( p | E) or that 
every epistemic agent that assigns a positive epistemic probability to P( p | E) will 
assign P(♢p | E) = 1.  The argument does aim to show that if an epistemic agent 
does assign a positive probability to P( p | E), then she should assign P(♢p | E) = 
1.  If she assigns a positive probability to P( p | E) and does not assign P(♢p | E) 
= 1, then she has mistakenly violated T6.  
3. Against Agnosticism 
  Suppose that your evidence for God's existence is E. E might include the 
cumulative evidence you have from the well-known arguments for God's 
existence. E might also include the cumulative evidence you have against God's 
existence. William Rowe suggests that, if the aim is to determine the epistemic 
probability that God exists, then the information in E should be restricted to 




I turn now to the background information k . . . What will k include? 
I take it as important here that k be restricted almost entirely to 
information that is shared by most theists and nontheists . . . To this 
end we will want to include in k our common knowledge of the 
occurrence of various evils in our world . . . as well as our knowledge 
that the world contains a great deal of evil. k will also include . . . our 
knowledge of many of the goods that occur and many of the goods 
that do not occur. . . 9  
If E includes the evidence shared by theists and nontheists—including the amount 
and distribution of evil, reports of religious experience, the total amount of good 
in the world, and so on—Rowe concludes that the probability that God exists 
should be about the same as the probability that God does not exist.  
If we conceive of k in the way just suggested, what assignment 
should be given to the probability that God exists given k, P(G | k)? 
. . . In order not to beg any . . . questions, I will assign 0.5 to P( G | 
k ), and of course 0.5 to P( ~G | k). We will say that k by itself 
makes neither God's existence nor his non-existence more likely 
than not.10 
The evidence E for God's existence makes the epistemic probability of God's 
existence about as probable as not. An epistemic agent informed on the evidence 




 But Rowe's conclusion is mistaken. It is not possible that P(God exists | E) 
= P(God does not exist | E), given the epistemic theses in T4 – T6.  The thesis in 
T6 entails that if we assign some positive epistemic probability to the proposition 
that God exists, then the epistemic probability that it is possible that God exists is 
1. This is just an instance of T6. 
T6. P(God exists | E) is positive only if P(♢(God exists) | E) = 1 
 It follows from M that the epistemic probability of God's actual existence is 
at least as high as the probability of God's possible existence, if God's possible 
existence entails God's actual existence. 
 
M.  (♢(God exists) ⟶ God exists) ⟶ (P(♢(God exists) | E) <  
      P(God exists | E)). 
The argument depends on establishing the proposition in N, which is not entirely 
uncontroversial. 
N.  (♢(God exists) ⟶ God exists) 
According to N, necessarily, if it is possible that God exists, then God in fact 
exists. S5 ensures that every possible world is modally equivalent to every other 
possible world. Any modal proposition true in any world is true in every world. 
Let's assume a conception of God according to which God exemplifies necessary 




the conception of God we are assuming, it follows that ♢◻(God exists). There is 
some possible world in which God necessarily exists. But all worlds are modally 
equivalent. If there is some possible world in which God necessarily exists, then 
God necessarily exists in every world. We conclude that ◻(God exists).  And it 
follows of course that God actually exists. The argument for N, therefore, 
depends on S5 and a conception of God according to which God is a necessarily 
existing being.  
 From T6 and the assumption that P(God exists) | E) is positive, we know 
that P(♢(God exists) | E) = 1. But from P(♢(God exists) | E) = 1, M and N we 
know that P(God exists) | E) = 1.  
 It follows from the probability axioms that Rowe's probability assignment 
is mistaken. We cannot assign P(God exists) | E) some positive probability and 
also assign P(God does not exist) | E) some positive probability. If we assign 
P(God exists) | E) some positive probability then we know that P(God does not 
exist) | E) = 0.  
 We can put the argument from T6 in a slightly more formal way. The 
numbers to the left of each premise indicate the assumptions on which the line is 
based. Included among the assumptions in the argument are T6, M, and N.11 
1   (1) P(God exists) | E) is positive    Assumption 
1, T6   (2) P(♢(God exists) | E) = 1   1, T6 




                          P(God exists|E))       M 
N   (4)  (♢(God exists) ⟶ God exists)     S5, N 
M,N   (5) P(♢(God exists)|E) < P(God exists| E)   3,4 MP 
1, T6, M, N  (6) ∴ P(God exists | E) = 1      2,5 Prob. Axioms 
The conclusion of the argument in (6) depends on assumptions (1), T6, M, and N. 
The assumption in (1) is uncontroversial, since it simply states that there is some 
positive epistemic probability that God exists. The argument simply does not 
apply to anyone who does not assign some positive epistemic probability to God's 
existence.  
 The remaining assumptions are T6, M, and N. But M is false only if  (p 
⟶ q), and P(p | E) > P(q | E). Is it possible that p entails q and the probability 
of p is greater than the probability of q? Suppose  (p ⟶ q).  We know that P(p | 
E) > P(q | E) is true only if some occurrences of p on E are not occurrences of q 
on E. But that is true only of ◊(p & ~q). And that is inconsistent with our 
assumption  (p ⟶ q).  So, M appears uncontroversial.  
 If there is a problem with the argument, then it must be with the 
assumption T6 or N. We offered a proof of T6 in section (2). But let's consider a 
more formal version of the proof of T6. Recall that T6 states that P( p | E) is 
positive only if P( ♢p | E) = 1. Let's assume that the antecedent of T6 is true. 




2   (2)  (E ⟶ ~p)     Assumption 
2    (3) P(~p | E) = 1     2, Prob. Axioms12 
2   (4) P(p | E) is not positive    3, Prob. Axioms 
1,2   (5)   ⋏                                                         1,4 Negation Elim.13 
1   (6) ~  (E ⟶ ~p)     2,5 Negation Intro. 
1   (7) ◊(E & p)      6, S5 
1   (8) ◊p       7, S5 
1   (9) ◻◊p      8, S5 
1   (10) P(◊p| E) = 1     9, Prob. Axioms 
    (11) P( p | E) is positive only if P(◊p| E) = 1 1, 10 ⟶Intro 
The inference to (3) does depend on the consistency of the evidence E. But ◊E 
follows from the assumption in (1) that P( p | E) is positive. P( p | E) is 
undefined when ~◊E. Premises (3) and (4) follow from the assumption in (2), and 
the assumption in (2) is discharged in premise (6). The assumption in premise (1), 
finally, is discharged in premise (11). The proposition in line (11) is just T6, and it 
depends on no assumptions at all.  
 The only assumption we have not considered from the argument above is 
N. According to N, it is possible that God exists only if God exists, or  (♢(God 
exists) ⟶ God exists). The argument we are advancing assumes a concept of God 
according to which God exists as a matter of metaphysical necessity. The 




existence. Indeed, the argument does not assume that anything, in any possible 
world, is identical to God. The assumption is rather that if there is some x in any 
possible world such that x = God, then x necessarily exists. And if x necessarily 
exists, then of course x exists. The inference is simpler in S5. For any proposition 
 p, it is an S5 theorem that ♢◻p ⟶ p. So, if it is possible that necessarily God 
exists, then God exists.  
 Still, it is possible to resist N. There are many alternative conceptions of 
God including pantheistic and panentheistic conceptions according to which God 
is not a necessarily existing being. There are Lewisian conceptions of God 
according to which there are infinitely many Gods in metaphysical space—none 
of them actual—all exemplifying various degrees of perfection. There are also 
quasi-traditional conceptions of God according to which God is a contingent 
being otherwise exemplifying most of the traditional divine attributes. Without N 
we cannot derive P(God exists) | E) = 1 from the assumption that P(God exists) 
| E) is positive. Agnosticism is a perfectly coherent attitude to take toward the 
existence of these non-traditional Gods. 
 But it is possible to avoid N altogether. There is an argument from T4 that 
if an epistemic agent places some positive probability on the proposition that God 
necessarily exists, then the agent must place probability 1 on the proposition that 
God exists. If you believe that the evidence you possess confirms to some degree 




certain that God exists. Of course, if you believe that the evidence you possess 
confirms to some degree that God does not exist, then the evidence you possess 
makes certain that God does not exist. Consider a formal argument for a theistic 
instance of T4. 
1 (1) P(☐(God exists) | E) is positive  Assumption 
   (2) P(☐(God exists) | E) is positive ⟶ ~  (E ⟶  (God does not exist)).   PA 
   (3) ~  (E ⟶  (God does not exist)) ⟶ ◊(E &  (God does not exist). S5 
   (4) ◊(E &  (God does not exist) ⟶   (God exists).  S5 
   (5)   (God exists) ⟶ P(☐(God exists) | E) = 1. PA 
   (6) P(☐(God exists) | E) = 1 ⟶ P(God exists | E) = 1. M 
   (7) P(God exists | E) = 1. 1,2,3,4,5,6 MP (multiple applications), 
   (8) ∴ P(☐(God exists) | E) is positive ⟶ P(God exists | E) = 1.  1,7 ⟶Intro. 
 The argument from T4 shows that…. 
 The argument from T6 establishes that if an epistemic agent assigns some 
positive probability to God's existence then she should assign probability 1 to 
God's existence. Epistemic agents cannot coherently hedge their bets on God's 
existence. Indeed, epistemic agents cannot assign any probability n (0 < n < 1) to 
God's existence. So, of course, epistemic agents cannot assign any probability n (0 




 It is true that few theists are absolutely certain that God exists. Most 
believers place some positive probability on the existence of God and some 
positive probability on the non-existence of God. But the argument from T6 
shows that the only coherent epistemic attitude available to theists is unhedged 
belief in God. The alternative attitudes available are non-theistic attitudes. The 
only available atheistic attitude is unhedged disbelief in God. Epistemic agents 
otherwise must reject the suggestion that there is any epistemic relationship 
between their evidence E—the totality of evidence for and against the existence of 
God—and the proposition that God exists. These epistemic agents assign no 
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= P(~☐p) . P(E | ~☐p)/P(~☐p). But given our assumption this is equivalent to 
P(~☐p | E) = P(~☐p) /P(~☐p) = 1. Alternatively, we know that P(~☐p | E) = 
P(~☐p & E)/P(E) = P(E)/P(E) = 1. 
9 William Rowe, 'The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look' in Daniel 
Howard Snyder (ed.) The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1996). pp. 264-5. 
10 Ibid. p. 265. 
11 The inference rules are from the S5 modal extension of NK. See Graeme Forbes, 
Modern Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
12 Assume  (E ⟶ ~p). We know that P(~p | E) = P(~p) . P(E | ~p)/P(E). But 
given our assumption this is equivalent to P(~p | E) = P(E) /P(E) = 1. Alternatively, 
we know that P(~p | E) = P(~p & E)/P(E) = P(E)/P(E) = 1.  
13 The rules of negation elimination and negation introduction operate together as a 
reductio ad absurdum rule. The absurdity ⋏ is derived on line (5) via negation 
elimination is applied to lines (1) and (4), and the assumption in line (2) is negated 
and discharged at line (6) via negation introduction. 
